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HOSANNA-TABOR AND SUPREME COURT 
PRECEDENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE SUPREME COURT‘S HANDS-OFF 
APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE 
Samuel J. Levine* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court‘s review of the decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the case of Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC1 could lead to a 
major development in the Court‘s Religion Clause jurisprudence.2  On one 
level, Hosanna-Tabor presents important questions regarding the 
interrelationship between employment discrimination laws and the 
constitutional rights of religious organizations.  The narrow issue at the 
center of the case is the ―ministerial exception,‖ a doctrine that precludes 
courts from adjudicating discrimination claims arising out of disputes 
between religious institutions and their ministerial employees.3  This Essay 
suggests, however, that the real significance of Hosanna-Tabor goes 
beyond the Court‘s application of the ministerial exception to the particular 
facts of the case.  This Essay looks at the ministerial exception through the 
broader prism of the Supreme Court‘s ―hands-off‖ approach to religious 
 
*
  Professor of Law & Director, Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center.  This Essay is based on my 
remarks presented as part of a panel on Hosanna-Tabor at the Second Annual Law and Religion 
Roundtable hosted by Andy Koppelman at Northwestern University School of Law on June 23 and 24, 
2011.  I thank Andy and the conference organizers, Rick Garnett, Paul Horwitz, and Nelson Tebbe, for 
inviting me to participate on the panel and the participants at the Roundtable for helpful conversations.  I 
thank Paul and the editors of the Northwestern University Law Review for publishing the Colloquy 
essays in connection with the panel, and I thank the editors of the Law Review for helpful comments on 
an earlier draft.  Finally, I thank Kent Greenawalt for thoughtful discussions of these issues and for 
continued support and guidance. 
1
  131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (granting petition for writ of certiorari for the Sixth Circuit‘s decision in 
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010) (link)) 
(link). 
2
  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .‖) (link). 
3
  See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 
345–47 (5th Cir. 1999) (link); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460–63 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(link). 
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doctrine, which prohibits judicial inquiry into a wide range of questions 
relating to religious practice and belief. 4 
Although a number of courts have adopted and applied the ministerial 
exception, both the constitutional basis for this principle and its scope are 
less than clear.5  Through a close reading of the opinion of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, this Essay suggests that the outcome 
in Hosanna-Tabor turns on an analysis of the ministerial exception within 
the broader context of a hands-off approach to religion.6  Indeed, in an 
opinion written by Judge Richard Posner, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit drew an explicit connection between the 
two doctrines, referring to ―[t]he ministerial exception, and the hands-off 
approach more generally . . . .‖7  Likewise, in looking at Hosanna-Tabor, 
this Essay aims to explore and relate the constitutional concerns underlying 
both the ministerial exception and the Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach.  
Specifically, this Essay argues that the Sixth Circuit opinion is inconsistent 
with Supreme Court precedent, running afoul of the Court‘s hands-off 
approach by relying on analysis of either the Free Exercise Clause, the 
Establishment Clause, or both, that requires judicial interpretation of 
religious doctrine. 
Therefore, the Essay concludes that the Supreme Court will have a 
number of options available for deciding Hosanna-Tabor.  Most narrowly, 
the Court may limit its response to a review of the reasoning and ruling set 
forth in the Sixth Circuit opinion, deciding that because the Sixth Circuit‘s 
analysis contradicts Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Circuit‘s holding 
should be reversed.  Alternatively, widening the scope of review, the 
Supreme Court may use Hosanna-Tabor to address, for the first time, the 
broader issue of the ministerial exception, providing guidance and direction 
for deciding future employment disputes involving religious organizations. 
Yet, this Essay encourages the Court to take a more ambitious and 
more dramatic step, viewing Hosanna-Tabor as an opportunity to rethink 
the hands-off approach to questions of religious practice and belief.  In the 
past, scholars and courts have encountered difficulty in attempting to 
 
4
  See Nat‘l Spiritual Assembly of Baha‘is of U.S. Under Hereditary Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat‘l 
Spiritual Assembly of Baha‘is of U.S., Inc., 628 F.3d 837, 846 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010) (link); Samuel J. 
Levine, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: An Introduction, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 793, 795 (2009) (link). 
5
  See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) like the Boy 
Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN‘S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 526–27 (2007); Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off 
Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 855–56 
(2009) (link). 
6
  See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006) (referring to ―[t]he 
ministerial exception, and the hands-off approach more generally‖) (link). 
7
  Id. 
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understand and apply elements of the Court‘s hands-off doctrine.8  The 
Sixth Circuit‘s lack of clarity and consistency in Hosanna-Tabor may stand 
as illustration of some of these difficulties.  Thus, Hosanna-Tabor may 
provide a particularly valuable opportunity for the Supreme Court to return 
to—and possibly rethink, reconsider, and reformulate—the current hands-
off approach to religious doctrine. 
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF HOSANNA-TABOR 
A. Background 
Although the Sixth Circuit opinion provides considerable background 
details, some of which appear to be in contention among the parties, a brief 
summary of the facts may be helpful.  In 1999, Hosanna-Tabor Church, an 
ecclesiastical corporation affiliated with the Lutheran Church-Missouri 
Synod (LCMS), hired Cheryl Perich to teach at a school it operates in 
Redford, Michigan.9  Perich taught at the school for several years under the 
title of ―commissioned minister‖ of the LCMS.10  When Perich became ill in 
2004, she agreed to the recommendation of Hosanna-Tabor‘s administrators 
that she take disability leave for the following school year.11  For over two 
months, beginning on December 16, 2004, Perich and the school engaged in 
a variety of disputes regarding her medical condition and the status of her 
future employment at the school.12  Perich reported for work on February 
22, 2005 after receiving clearance from her doctor.  However, the school 
informed Perich that her employment would likely be terminated.  Perich 
threatened to file a disability discrimination suit in response.13  On March 
19, 2005, Hosanna-Tabor informed Perich that its Board of Directors would 
consider rescinding her call to teach due to insubordination and disruptive 
behavior and stated that she had damaged her relationship with Hosanna-
Tabor ―beyond repair‖ by ―threatening to take legal action.‖14 
Two days later, Perich‘s lawyer formally informed Hosanna-Tabor‘s 
lawyer of the possibility that Perich would file a discrimination charge.15  
On April 11, 2005, Hosanna-Tabor terminated Perich pursuant to a vote of 
the congregation.16  Perich responded by filing a charge of discrimination 
and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
 
8
  See Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off!  Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1846 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off 
Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 86 (1997). 
9
  EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2010). 
10
  See id. 
11
  Id. at 773. 
12
  See id. at 773–74. 
13
  Id. at 774. 
14
  Id. 
15
  Id. at 775. 
16
  Id. 
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(EEOC), and the EEOC subsequently filed a complaint against Hosanna-
Tabor for retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (ADA).17  When the case came before the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Michigan, the court granted Hosanna-Tabor‘s 
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the ministerial exception 
to the ADA barred the court from inquiring into Perich‘s retaliation claim.18  
Perich and the EEOC then appealed to the Sixth Circuit. 
Hosanna-Tabor argued that in submitting her claim outside an internal 
church forum, Perich violated church doctrine, demonstrating that she was 
not qualified to continue to function as a minister within the church and 
resulting in her dismissal.19  Perich countered that neither the school‘s 
employment manuals nor the correspondence between her and Hosanna-
Tabor referenced church doctrine or the procedure for internal dispute 
resolution.20  Therefore, in Perich‘s view, Hosanna-Tabor‘s actions were not 
taken pursuant to religious doctrine.21 
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court‘s decision, primarily on the 
grounds that ―the district court erred in its legal conclusion classifying 
Perich as a ministerial employee.‖22  The Sixth Circuit found that ―Perich‘s 
primary function was teaching secular subjects, not ‗spreading the 
faith . . .‘‖23 and her ―extra religious training . . . did not affect the duties she 
performed in the classroom on a daily basis.‖24  Therefore, the court held, 
Perich did not qualify as a ministerial employee for the purposes of 
applying the ministerial exception to her dispute with Hosanna-Tabor. 
B.  The Sixth Circuit Opinion 
The Sixth Circuit‘s decision, reversing the district court, turns entirely 
on the court‘s interpretation of the contours of the ministerial exception and 
its application to the facts of the case.  Yet, the Sixth Circuit‘s discussion of 
the constitutional basis for the ministerial exception relies on seemingly 
imprecise and unspecific constitutional analysis, raising questions about the 
strength of the court‘s assessment.  The Sixth Circuit‘s analysis opened 
with the broad and arguably vague assertion that ―[t]he ministerial 
exception is rooted in the First Amendment‘s guarantees of religious 
freedom.‖25  The court then divided this section of the opinion into two 
 
17
  42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 12203(a) (2006) (link). 
18
  EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 892 (E.D. 
Mich. 2008), rev’d, 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010) (link). 
19
  See Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 774, 781. 
20
  See id. at 782. 
21
  See id. 
22
  Id. at 780. 
23
  Id. (quoting Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007) (link)). 
24
  Id. 
25
  Id. at 777. 
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subsections, each offering a theory to explain the rationale behind the rule 
that courts are precluded from adjudicating claims between churches and 
their ministerial employees. 
In the first subsection, entitled ―Interference in Church Governance,‖ 
the court stated that the ministerial exception ―precludes subject matter 
jurisdiction over claims involving the employment relationship between a 
religious institution and its ministerial employees, based on the institution‘s 
constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection of 
those employees.‖26  The court identified neither a constitutional provision 
nor a Supreme Court case that articulates such a ―constitutional right‖ of 
religious institutions.  Instead, in apparent support for this asserted right, the 
court merely appended a reference to a Supreme Court case, Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.27
  
The reference to Milivojevich, 
which follows the similarly vague signal, ―[s]ee generally,‖28 includes 
neither a pin cite nor a parenthetical, and is offered without any further 
context or comment.  Although Milivojevich may very well have some 
bearing on the issue of judicial interference in church governance, the 
opinion leaves it to the reader to determine the relationship, if any, between 
Milivojevich and the ministerial exception.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
not yet recognized the ministerial exception in Milovejevich or any other 
case. 
The second subsection in this section of the Sixth Circuit opinion 
begins with the heading, ―Interpretation of Church Doctrine.‖29  Here again, 
the court‘s constitutional analysis remains vague, offering the declaration 
that ―the ministerial exception is also motivated by the concern ‗that secular 
authorities would be involved in evaluating or interpreting religious 
doctrine.‘‖30 
The lack of specificity in both of the court‘s theories is telling.  The 
court does not identify a textual basis for the ministerial exception in either 
the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause.  Instead, the court 
alludes to a ―constitutional right‖ for a religious institution to be free from 
judicial interference and to a ―concern‖ over courts‘ interpretations of 
religious doctrine.31  The Sixth Circuit‘s failure to support these assertions 
with a direct citation to Supreme Court precedent raises further questions 
about the soundness of the ministerial exception‘s doctrinal basis. 
 
26
  Id. (quoting Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225). 
27
  426 U.S. 696 (1976) (link). 
28
  Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 777. 
29
  Id. at 781. 
30
  Id. (quoting Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
31
  Id. at 777, 781. 
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II. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION, THE RELIGION CLAUSES, AND 
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: OPEN QUESTIONS ABOUT HOSANNA-TABOR 
A careful consideration of the Sixth Circuit opinion in Hosanna-Tabor 
requires a more precise analysis of the constitutional basis for the 
ministerial exception.  However, to the extent that the Sixth Circuit 
implicitly intended to rely on the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of either 
the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause, the court‘s reasoning 
in Hosanna-Tabor appears to contradict Supreme Court jurisprudence in 
both of these areas.  Specifically, in relying on judicial interpretation of 
religious doctrine, the Sixth Circuit opinion is inconsistent with Supreme 
Court‘s hands-off approach to questions of religious practice and belief. 
A. The Free Exercise Clause 
Although the Sixth Circuit opinion did not include an express citation 
to the Free Exercise Clause, the court may have been alluding to free 
exercise protections through its reference to a religious institution‘s 
―constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection of 
[ministerial] employees.‖32  If so, however, the court‘s application of free 
exercise rights in Hosanna-Tabor seems inconsistent with basic elements of 
the Supreme Court‘s free exercise jurisprudence. 
As a threshold matter, current free exercise doctrine may exclude 
application of the ministerial exception to employment discrimination 
claims.  In the landmark 1990 case Employment Division v. Smith, the 
Supreme Court held that a law that is facially neutral and generally 
applicable does not run afoul of free exercise protections, even if the law 
places a burden on a religious practice.33  In Hosanna-Tabor, Perich 
claimed that the school violated her employment rights pursuant to the 
ADA, a facially neutral and generally applicable law.34  Therefore, under 
Smith, even if enforcement of the ADA would interfere with the school‘s 
ability to select its ministerial employees, arguably burdening its religious 
exercise, the school would not have a free exercise claim in the context of 
the requirements of the ADA.  The contours of the ministerial exception 
would simply not extend to provide a defense against a violation of a 
generally applicable law.35 
Alternatively, some courts have held that the ministerial exception 
survived the Smith decision,36 and therefore, the school may have a free 
exercise claim against the application of the ADA to disputes regarding its 
 
32
  Id. at 777 (quoting Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
33
  494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (link). 
34
  See Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 776–77. 
35
  See, e.g., Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (link). 
36
  See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 
348–49 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461–63 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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ministerial employees.  Nevertheless, putting aside possible concerns over 
Smith, the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis in Hosanna-Tabor appears to conflict 
with other aspects of Supreme Court precedent.  Specifically—and 
somewhat ironically—in an ostensible effort to apply a hands-off approach 
to judicial interference in religious practice, the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis 
instead contradicts other elements of the Supreme Court‘s hands-off 
approach to interpreting religious doctrine in free exercise cases. 
In the 1981 case, Thomas v. Review Board, the Supreme Court 
considered the free exercise claim of a Jehovah‘s Witness, Eddie Thomas, 
who quit his job on the ground that his religion prohibited him from 
working on the production of armaments.37  Thomas argued that the state‘s 
subsequent denial of his unemployment benefits violated his constitutional 
right to the free exercise of religion.38  The Indiana Supreme Court rejected 
his claim, in part because it found that his decision to quit was based on his 
―personal philosophical choice‖ rather than religious belief.39 
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the methodology the Indiana 
court used in its determination that Thomas‘s objection to working on 
armaments did not qualify as free exercise of religion.40  The Court 
observed that ―[t]he Indiana court . . . appears to have given significant 
weight to the fact that another Jehovah‘s Witness had no scruples about 
working on tank turrets; for that other Witness, at least, such work was 
‗scripturally‘ acceptable.‖41  In contrast, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
need for judges to maintain a hands-off approach in addressing matters of 
internal religious dispute.42 
With respect to the dispute between Thomas and another Jehovah‘s 
Witness, the Court noted that ―[i]ntrafaith differences of that kind are not 
uncommon among followers of a particular creed . . . .‖43  In these 
scenarios, the Court insisted, ―the judicial process is singularly ill equipped 
to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses.‖44  Declaring 
that ―the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared 
by all of the members of a religious sect,‖ the Court concluded that 
―[p]articularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function and 
judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker 
more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.  Courts are 
not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.‖45 
 
37
  Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp‘t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 709 (1981) (link). 
38
  See id. at 711–12. 
39
  Id. at 712–13. 
40
  See id. at 716. 
41
  Id. at 715. 
42
  See id. at 716. 
43
  Id. at 715. 
44
  Id. 
45
  Id. at 715–16. 
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As in Thomas, the outcome in Hosanna-Tabor may turn, in part, on the 
appropriate judicial response to an intrafaith dispute central to the religious 
claim in the case.  One of the key points of contention between the parties 
in Hosanna-Tabor is whether Perich‘s primary duties as a teacher at the 
school were religious or secular in nature.46  As a matter of interpreting its 
own religious doctrine, the school characterized Perich‘s duties as spiritual 
in nature while Perich advocated a different view of her position, pointing 
to what she saw as the largely secular nature of her duties.47  According to 
the Sixth Circuit, the resolution of this crucial question would determine 
whether Perich‘s employment status qualified for the ministerial 
exception.48 
Nevertheless, rather than resolving the argument between Hosanna-
Tabor and Perich regarding the nature of her employment, the district court 
applied a hands-off approach to the intrafaith dispute.49  As it explained at 
length: 
 
The separation of church and state in the United States 
has made federal courts inept when it comes to religious 
issues; the inquiry into the value of an employee in 
furthering a religious institution‘s sectarian mission is no 
different.  The lack of clarity in federal court cases 
regarding elementary school teachers should not hinder 
churches from valuing teachers as important spiritual 
leaders and deciding who will fill those positions as 
ministerial employees, subject, of course, to inappropriate 
uses of the title ―minister‖ as subterfuge.  For these reasons, 
it seems prudent in this case to trust Hosanna-Tabor‘s 
characterization of its own employee in the months and 
years preceding the events that led to litigation.  Because 
Hosanna-Tabor considered Perich a ―commissioned 
minister‖ and the facts surrounding Perich‘s employment in 
a religious school with a sectarian mission support this 
characterization, the Court concludes that Perich was a 
ministerial employee.  If, on these circumstances, the Court 
were to conclude otherwise, it would risk ―infring[ing] 




  See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir. 
2010). 
47
  See id. at 780–81. 
48
  See id. at 778. 
49
  See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881 (E.D. 
Mich. 2008), rev’d, 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010).  
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Because Perich was a ministerial employee of 
Hosanna-Tabor, this Court can inquire no further into her 
claims of retaliation.  Under the circumstances, ―the free 
exercise clause of the First Amendment protects the act of a 
decision rather than a motivation behind it.  In these 
sensitive areas, the state may no more require a minimum 
basis in doctrinal reasoning than it may supervise doctrinal 
content.‖50 
 
Although the district court did not cite Thomas, its reasoning followed 
a similar approach to intrafaith disputes over religious doctrine.  Because 
the district court understood the ministerial exception to be grounded in the 
free exercise rights of a religious institution, the court declined to conduct 
an ―inquiry into the value of an employee in furthering a religious 
institution‘s sectarian mission . . . .‖51  Rather, as in Thomas, the court took 
a hands-off approach to the question of religious doctrine, accepting the 
religious adherent‘s assertion that the conduct at issue constituted an 
element of the free exercise of religion.  Accordingly, the court found it 
―prudent in this case to trust Hosanna-Tabor‘s characterization of its own 
employee . . . .‖52  In fact, without a direct citation, the district court‘s 
conclusion echoes the Court‘s language in Thomas, referring to ―these 
sensitive areas‖ of doctrinal determination that remain outside judicial 
competence.53 
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis in Hosanna-Tabor seems to 
conflict with the hands-off approach prescribed by the Supreme Court in 
Thomas.  Engaging in the kind of inquiry that the district court in Hosanna-
Tabor—and the Supreme Court in Thomas—considered improper, the Sixth 
Circuit rejected the school‘s characterization of Perich‘s role.  Instead, the 
court reached its own conclusion that Perich‘s duties were not sufficiently 
spiritual in nature to qualify her position for the ministerial exception.54 
To justify its reversal of the district court‘s findings, the Sixth Circuit 
asserted that ―the district court relied largely on the fact that Hosanna-Tabor 
gave Perich the title of commissioned minister and held her out to the world 
as a minister by bestowing this title upon her.‖55  As the appellate court 
noted, according to some courts, the mere title of minister is insufficient to 
demonstrate that an employee‘s position is, in fact, spiritual in nature and 
 
50
  Id. at 891–92 (citations omitted). 
51
  Id. at 891. 
52
  Id. at 892. 
53
  Id. 
54
  See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 780–81 (6th 
Cir. 2010). 
55
  Id. at 780. 
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therefore subject to the ministerial exception.56  However, the Sixth Circuit 
failed to acknowledge that the district court expressly rejected 
―inappropriate uses of the title ‗minister‘ as subterfuge‖ for the purpose of 
improperly applying the ministerial exception to a non-ministerial 
employee.57  Contrary to the Sixth Circuit‘s assertion—and consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent in Thomas—the district court relied not on the 
title granted by the school, but on Hosanna-Tabor‘s doctrinal understanding 
of Perich‘s role as a teacher.58 
Indeed, as the Sixth Circuit acknowledged, Hosanna-Tabor 
―characterizes its staff members as ‗fine Christian role models,‘‖ serving, in 
the school‘s view, an important religious function.59  Moreover, in a 
footnote, the court quotes Hosanna-Tabor‘s citation to Perich‘s own 
statement that ―the educational ministry is special because the teacher can 
bring God into every subject.‖60  Yet, rather than accepting Hosanna-
Tabor‘s characterization—or Perich‘s characterization, for that matter—of 
the spiritual value of the classroom teacher, the Sixth Circuit imposed its 
own formalistic standard, finding that ―only twice did Perich bring religion 
into otherwise secular subjects.‖61  The opinion failed to recognize, 
however, the variety of ways in which, from its own perspective, a religious 
institution may look to teachers of all subjects to bring God into the 
classroom.62  In short, contrary to the Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach 
in Thomas, the Sixth Circuit seemed willing to substitute its own 
understanding of religious doctrine for that of the religious adherent whose 
free exercise rights it is adjudicating.63 
Notably, near the close of the subsection of the opinion concerned with 
judicial interference in church governance, the Sixth Circuit emphasized 
that the ―intent of the ministerial exception is to allow religious 
organizations to prefer members of their own religion and adhere to their 
 
56
  Id. at 780–81 (citing EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 285 (5th Cir. 
1981) (link)). 
57
  Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 891–92. 
58
  See id. 
59
  Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 780. 
60
  Id. at 780 n.8 (quotation marks omitted). 
61
  Id. 
62
  See Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2011) (manuscript at 59–60), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883657 (describing various ways in 
which teachers in religious schools may be expected to integrate religion into every subject) (link). 
The Sixth Circuit‘s failure to appreciate the perspective of the religious school in this case mirrors 
some of the Supreme Court‘s failures to understand the perspectives of religious minorities.  See Samuel 
J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious 
Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 153 (1996). 
63
  See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass‘n, 485 U.S. 439, 457–58 (1988) (―[T]he 
dissent‘s approach would require us to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand their own 
religious beliefs.  We think such an approach cannot be squared with the Constitution or with our 
precedents, and that it would cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play.‖). 
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own religious interpretations.‖64  Ironically, in rejecting Hosanna-Tabor‘s 
characterization of the spiritual value and religious significance of Perich‘s 
position, the Sixth Circuit refused to allow a religious organization to 
adhere to its own religious interpretations. 
Of course, in deciding Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court has the 
option to reconsider and revise the hands-off approach to permit the kind of 
judicial interpretation of religious doctrine that served as the basis for the 
Sixth Circuit holding.  In fact, courts and scholars have encountered some 
difficulty understanding and applying the Court‘s hands-off approach,65 
suggesting the need for the Court to clarify its rulings in this area.  
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis contradicts the current state of the 
hands-off approach.  Therefore, absent a substantial overruling by the 
Supreme Court of its own precedent, the Sixth Circuit opinion should likely 
be reversed. 
B. The Establishment Clause/Church Property Cases 
As an alternative—or perhaps as a complement—to a free exercise 
analysis, other parts of Sixth Circuit opinion suggest that its allusion to ―the 
First Amendment‘s guarantees of religious freedom‖ that lie at the ―root[]‖ 
of the ministerial exception66 may refer to religious freedoms protected by 
the Establishment Clause.  Again, however, the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis 
requires judicial interpretation of religious doctrine, contradicting the 
Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach in Establishment Clause cases as well. 
Following the subsection in the Hosanna-Tabor opinion that focuses 
on governmental interference in church governance, a less extensive 
subsection refers to an ―addition[al] . . . concern ‗that secular authorities 
would be involved in evaluating or interpreting religious doctrine.‘‖67  
Although, as Thomas illustrates, concerns over judicial interpretation of 
religious doctrine apply to free exercise cases as well, though these 
concerns are more commonly associated with the Establishment Clause.  
Therefore, in raising this issue in the context of Hosanna-Tabor, the Sixth 
Circuit quite possibly locates the ministerial exception within the 
protections of the Establishment Clause.  Nevertheless, given the absence of 
an express reference to the Establishment Clause in Hosanna-Tabor, it may 
be necessary to examine the court‘s opinion more carefully in an effort to 
identify the precise constitutional basis and nature of the constitutional 
―concern‖ over judicial evaluation of religious doctrine. 
In articulating this concern, the court relies on and quotes from the 
opinions of two other circuit courts that have applied the ministerial 
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  Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 781. 
65
  See Greenawalt, supra note 8; Levine, supra note 8. 
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  Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 777. 
67
  Id. at 781. 
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exception, the Seventh Circuit and the Fifth Circuit.68  Accordingly, it may 
be helpful to look at the reasoning underlying each of these cases to better 
understand the constitutional basis for the court‘s analysis of the ministerial 
exception in Hosanna-Tabor. 
In the first case cited, Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, Judge 
Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, identified two ―First 
Amendment concerns with assuming jurisdiction in ecclesiastical cases.‖69  
Both of these concerns seemingly parallel the concerns the Sixth Circuit 
raised in Hosanna-Tabor: 
 
The first concern is that secular authorities would be 
involved in evaluating or interpreting religious doctrine.  
The second quite independent concern is that in 
investigating employment discrimination claims by 
ministers against their church, secular authorities would 
necessarily intrude into church governance . . . even if the 
alleged discrimination were purely nondoctrinal.  This 
second aspect of the internal-affairs doctrine is called the 
―ministerial exception‖ to the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction.70 
 
Upon close examination, however, Judge Posner‘s analysis may not 
serve to clarify the Sixth Circuit‘s reasoning in Hosanna-Tabor.  First, 
unlike the Sixth Circuit, Judge Posner tied the ministerial exception 
specifically to the concern over judicial intrusion into church governance, 
which he expressly distinguished as ―independent‖ from the proposition 
that courts should not interpret religious doctrine.71  Thus, as a basic matter, 
Judge Posner‘s conception of the ministerial exception appears to differ 
from that of the Sixth Circuit, which identifies opposition to judicial 
determination of church doctrine as a motivating factor for the ministerial 
exception.72 
Second, like the Sixth Circuit, Judge Posner referred to vague ―First 
Amendment concerns‖ and only briefly cited Supreme Court precedent in 
support of a prohibition on judicial interpretation of religious doctrine.73  
Ultimately, notwithstanding a somewhat more extensive discussion and 
more citations to Supreme Court cases, the Seventh Circuit likewise did not 
delineate the constitutional grounds for the ministerial exception in a 
 
68
  See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006); Combs v. Cent. Tex. 
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999). 
69
  442 F.3d at 1039 (alteration omitted). 
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  Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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  Id. 
72
  See Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 781. 
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  Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1037–39. 
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manner that would provide insight into the Sixth Circuit‘s constitutional 
analysis in Hosanna-Tabor. 
A more helpful analysis may be found in the other case cited in 
Hosanna-Tabor.  In Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of United 
Methodist Church, following an extensive free exercise discussion, the Fifth 
Circuit added: ―Having a civil court determine the merits of canon law 
scholarship would be in violent opposition to the constitutional principle of 
the separation of church and state.‖74  Although the court did not cite the 
Establishment Clause, the reliance on the separation of church and state 
suggests that this concern is grounded in the Establishment Clause. 
Moreover, the court in Combs cited Presbyterian Church v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,75 a case involving a 
church property dispute, for the proposition that ―civil courts are not 
permitted to determine ecclesiastical questions.‖76  The reliance on 
Presbyterian Church is significant, as the Fifth Circuit‘s analysis thereby 
drew a parallel between the ministerial exception and church property 
cases.  While Hosanna-Tabor will provide the first opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to consider the ministerial exception, church property cases 
have formed the building blocks of the Court‘s hands-off approach to 
religious doctrine.77  Therefore, to the extent that church property cases play 
a significant role underlying both circuit court approaches to the ministerial 
exception and the Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach, perhaps the Sixth 
Circuit‘s analysis of the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor is best 
evaluated through a closer look at the Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach 
in church property cases. 
Presbyterian Church, the case cited in the Fifth Circuit‘s analysis of 
the ministerial exception, involved yet another intrafaith dispute: two local 
churches withdrew from a national church contending that the national 
church violated the organization‘s constitution and departed from church 
doctrine.78  The Georgia state courts held that the national church‘s control 
over the property depended on its adherence to doctrine as it existed at the 
time of the local church‘s affiliation.79  Here too, the Supreme Court 
forcefully rejected an approach that required courts to interpret and apply 
religious doctrine: 
 
First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when 
church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution 
by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and 
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  Combs, 173 F.3d at 350. 
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  393 U.S. 440 (1969) (link). 
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  Combs, 173 F.3d at 350. 
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  See Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 1856; Levine, supra note 8, at 88–90. 
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  See Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 442. 
79
  See id. at 443–44. 
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practice.  If civil courts undertake to resolve such 
controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, 
the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free 
development of religious doctrine and of implicating 
secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical 
concern . . . .  [T]he Amendment therefore commands civil 
courts to decide church property disputes without resolving 
underlying controversies over religious doctrine. . . .  The 
Georgia courts have violated the command of the First 
Amendment . . . .  [T]he departure-from-doctrine 
element . . . requires the civil court to determine matters at 
the very core of a religion—the interpretation of particular 
church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to 
the religion.  Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil 
courts from playing such a role . . . .  To reach those 
questions would require the civil courts to engage in the 
forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church 
doctrine.80 
 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court‘s unequivocal declarations in 
Presbyterian Church and other church property cases that the First 
Amendment prohibits courts from interpreting and determining religious 
doctrine, the Court‘s opinions are less committal regarding the precise 
textual or doctrinal grounds for this constitutional principle.  As Kent 
Greenawalt observed in commenting on Presbyterian Church: ―Without 
distinguishing the effect of the two religion clauses, the Court considered 
their joint operation to preclude states from using a departure-from-doctrine 
standard.‖81  However, as Greenawalt and others have further noted, a 
meaningful analysis and application of the Court‘s church property cases 
requires a determination of the precise constitutional basis for the Court‘s 
holdings.82  After all, although the Court does not distinguish between the 
two Religion Clauses in these cases, as a doctrinal and conceptual matter, a 
Free Exercise Clause analysis of church property disputes differs 
substantially from an Establishment Clause analysis. 
For his part, Greenawalt has analyzed the Supreme Court‘s hands-off 
approach in church property cases primarily under the Lemon test for the 
Establishment Clause.83  In particular, Greenawalt has suggested that the 
―entanglement worry‖ of the Lemon test ―fits very well with a strong 
‗hands-off approach;‘ courts should not become adjudicators of religious 
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  Id. at 449–51. 
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  Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 1857. 
82
  See id.; Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981). 
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matters.‖84  Under this interpretation of the Establishment Clause, courts are 
prohibited from deciding cases that would entangle them in matters of 
church doctrine and governance.  Accordingly, just as the Supreme Court 
has taken a hands-off approach to disputes over the ownership of church 
property, the Sixth Circuit applied the ministerial exception in Hosanna-
Tabor to maintain a hands-off approach to a dispute over the appointment 
and dismissal of ministers. 
Still, viewing the ministerial exception within the broader context of a 
general prohibition on judicial entanglement in religious matters would 
raise questions about the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis in Hosanna-Tabor.  Under 
the Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach, judges may not engage in an 
inquiry that would require investigation, interpretation, and determination 
of church doctrine.  The church property cases are one illustration of the 
Court‘s attempts to place limitations on the judiciary‘s role in litigation that 
arises out of intrafaith disputes over matters of religion.  Similarly, the 
hands-off approach would seem to preclude judicial involvement in 
intrachurch disputes over the employment of ministers, including doctrinal 
disputes between a religious employer and a ministerial employee. 
However, in Hosanna-Tabor the Sixth Circuit did, in fact, engage in 
the kind of religious interpretation prohibited under the hands-off approach.  
According to Hosanna-Tabor, Perich violated church doctrine that required 
her to submit her claim to an internal church forum for dispute resolution.85  
Hosanna-Tabor further contended that Perich‘s failure to follow church 
doctrine demonstrated that she was not qualified to continue to function as a 
minister within the church, resulting in her dismissal.86  Perich countered 
that the LCMS personnel manual and the Governing Manual for Lutheran 
Schools ―clearly contemplate that teachers are protected by employment 
discrimination and contract laws.‖87  Moreover, Perich noted that the 
correspondence between her and Hosanna-Tabor did not reference church 
doctrine or the procedure for internal dispute resolution.88  Therefore, in 
Perich‘s view, Hosanna-Tabor‘s actions were not taken pursuant to 
religious doctrine.89 
The conflicting arguments between Hosanna-Tabor and Perich 
revolved squarely around the parties‘ conflicting interpretations of Lutheran 
church doctrine.  Therefore, judicial resolution of these arguments would 
require a determination of the correct interpretation of church doctrine.  
However, pursuant to Supreme Court precedent in cases of intrafaith church 
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properly disputes, a court would be precluded from adjudicating these 
questions in favor of either interpretation.  Applying the Supreme Court‘s 
hands-off approach to the dispute in Hosanna-Tabor, a court would have no 
authority to reject Hosanna-Tabor‘s interpretation of its own religious 
doctrine, and therefore, no grounds for ruling in favor of Perich‘s 
discrimination claim.  Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit endorsed Perich‘s 
interpretation, faulting Hosanna-Tabor for ―attempt[ing] to reframe the 
underlying dispute . . . to the question of whether Perich violated church 
doctrine by not engaging in internal dispute resolution.‖90  By its very 
nature, the court‘s characterization and repudiation of Hosanna-Tabor‘s 
argument is premised on the court‘s determination that Perich, and not 
Hosanna-Tabor, has correctly interpreted church doctrine. 
The Sixth Circuit offered no explanation as to why its approach would 
not violate Supreme Court precedent, or why its analysis would not 
contradict the Sixth Circuit‘s own articulation of one of the concerns 
underlying the ministerial exception: ―that secular authorities would be 
involved in evaluating or interpreting religious doctrine.‖91  Ultimately, in 
rejecting the applicability of the ministerial exception and the hands-off 
approach to the dispute between Hosanna-Tabor and Perich, the Sixth 
Circuit appears to have rejected the underlying basis for both the ministerial 
exception and the broader hands-off approach to matters of religious 
doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
The pending Supreme Court consideration of Hosanna-Tabor has 
brought about much anticipation among scholars, practitioners, and 
religious organizations.  The case has engendered both scholarship and 
amicus briefs addressing and advocating both sides of the dispute.  In Rick 
Garnett‘s opinion, Hosanna-Tabor will be ―among the most important 
religious-freedom decisions of the last 30 years.‖92 
The Supreme Court will have a number of options available when it 
selects a methodology for deciding Hosanna-Tabor.  On one level, the 
Court may choose to take a narrow view of the case, limiting its review to 
the analysis and ruling set forth in the Sixth Circuit opinion.  Under this 
option, the Court may conclude that the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis 
contradicted basic elements of the Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach to 
religious doctrine, and therefore, the Sixth Circuit‘s holding should be 
reversed.  As detailed at length in this Essay, whether the Sixth Circuit was 
relying on Free Exercise or Establishment Clause principles, its application 
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of the ministerial exception to the dispute between Hosanna-Tabor and 
Perich included modes of inquiry that are inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court‘s hands-off approach. 
Alternatively, for the first time, the Supreme Court may address the 
broader issue of the ministerial exception.  As a judicially created doctrine 
with constitutional implications, the ministerial exception has been the 
source of substantial controversy and confusion among courts and scholars 
alike.  Accordingly, the ministerial exception would seem to be a 
particularly suitable doctrine for the Supreme Court to take on directly.  A 
Supreme Court decision confronting complex issues revolving around the 
basis, scope, and contours of the ministerial exception would provide courts 
across the country with sorely needed guidance and direction. 
Finally, and most ambitiously, perhaps the Supreme Court will see 
Hosanna-Tabor as an opportunity to rethink the hands-off approach to 
questions of religious practice and belief.  Both scholars and courts have 
encountered difficulty attempting to understand and apply elements of the 
Court‘s hands-off doctrine.93  The Sixth Circuit‘s lack of clarity and 
consistency in Hosanna-Tabor may stand as an example of some of the 
substantive drawbacks to the Supreme Court‘s current approach. 
Policy concerns over the Court‘s hands-off approach may be even 
more significant.  There are certainly strong reasons underlying the general 
principle that courts should be reluctant to engage in the interpretation and 
determination of religious questions.  However, the Supreme Court‘s broad 
articulation and application of this principle preclude courts from 
adjudicating a wide range of disputes, at times impeding the effective 
administration of justice.94 
This concern may manifest itself in Free Exercise challenges, in which 
a court‘s unwillingness to carefully analyze religious questions may result 
in decisions that are too deferential to the religious adherent or—more 
likely—the government.95  Likewise, in some Establishment Clause cases, a 
court‘s failure to examine the religious character of a practice or symbol 
may prevent an appropriate and careful balancing of the interests of 
nonestablishment with those of acceptable accommodation, resulting in 
improper governmental endorsement of religion or inadequate acceptance 
of appropriate forms of public expression.96 
 
93
  See Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 1846. 
94
  See Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine?  Judicial Authority to 
Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497 (2005); Levine, supra note 8. 
95
  See Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 1906 (the ―major basis for the decision [in Employment Division 
v. Smith] is that courts should not have to assess religious understandings and the strength of religious 
feeling in order to decide if the religious claim is strong enough to warrant an exemption.‖ (footnote 
omitted)); Levine, supra note 8, at 88 (―[T]he Court‘s decision in Employment Division v. Smith was, in 
part, a result of the Court‘s increasing reluctance to decide questions involving religious 
interpretation.‖). 
96
  See Levine, supra note 8. 
106: 120 (2011)                                 Hosanna-Tabor and Supreme Court Precedent 
137 
Finally, in cases of intrafaith disputes, such as church property cases 
and Hosanna-Tabor, a court‘s refusal to look into the asserted religious 
grounds for a religious organization‘s decisions may grant too much 
deference to powerful institutions.  In these cases, less powerful groups and 
individuals may find themselves bereft of legal recourse for otherwise 
meritorious legal claims.  Thus, Hosanna-Tabor may provide a particularly 
valuable opportunity for the Supreme Court to return to—and possibly 
rethink, reconsider, and reformulate—its hands-off approach to religious 
doctrine. 
